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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS, IMPLIED 
TERMS AND JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING 
Jack Hodder∗ 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is a very great privilege to participate in a conference honouring Sir Ivor Richardson's 
judicial career.  Over a quarter of a century, that career has been marked by conspicuous 
intellectual horsepower, fine prose, and extraordinary productivity.  It has also been 
marked by a consistent and careful appreciation of the contexts and limits within which 
judicial work is undertaken. 
There were of course earlier distinguished careers as a scholar, as an academic, and as a 
practitioner.  Among many other things, and unlike some other judicial appointees, those 
earlier careers meant that Sir Ivor took up his judicial office having a close acquaintance 
with, and a deep understanding of, commercial activity and commercial law principles.  
Given the importance of those matters to wealth creation and the material well-being of 
our country, Sir Ivor's outstanding contribution to the coherence of our commercial law 
has been, and may be expected to remain, truly invaluable. 
This paper relates to the topic "facilitating and regulating employment".  It reflects a 
perspective that employment is a contractual arrangement, and cannot be divorced from a 
commercial context.  It also reflects a perspective that the judicial law-making role is 
appropriately limited in scope.  Sir Ivor's judicial contribution to our employment law 
suggests substantial sympathy with those perspectives. 
The involvement of common law judges in employment disputes has been a matter of 
political controversy in the United Kingdom since the late nineteenth century, and 
generally avoided by industrial legislation there and in New Zealand.  Many of those 
controversies were traversed in Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law1 and Griffith, The 
  
∗ Partner, Chapman Tripp Sheffield Young, Wellington. 
1  Kenneth W Wedderburn The Worker and the Law (2 ed, Penguin, London, 1971). 
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Politics of the Judiciary.2 With less obliqueness than most legal commentators, Griffith said 
of the House of Lords' decision in Associated Newspapers Ltd v Wilson:3 
The best that can be made of the opinions of the Law Lords is that those who were strongest in 
the majority (Keith and Bridge) could be fairly described as old Tories, that the dissidents 
(Slynn and Lloyd) resembled new Labour, and that the reluctant middleman (Browne-
Wilkinson) looked like a Liberal Democrat.  So there may be some hope for the future. 
As discussed below, one should not underestimate the employment consequences of 
the "reluctant middleman", Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
For New Zealand observers of the modern judicial contribution to employment law 
(and more), the controversial split decision in Brighouse Limited v Bilderbeck4 was a 
landmark.  Among other things, it contributed to strong criticisms from commercial 
quarters of the Court of Appeal's decision-making; and it indicated that Sir Ivor 
Richardson's approach was different.  That indication duly matured in the extraordinary 
reversal of Brighouse by six members of a seven judge court in Aoraki Corporation Limited v 
McGavin.5 
In his dissenting judgment in Brighouse, Sir Ivor advanced a careful analysis of 
principles relevant to contemporary employment law.  Although he focussed on the 
immediate context of redundancy, this analysis remains important.  While employers 
generally have better things to do than read judicial prose, few employers would have 
failed to applaud Sir Ivor's statement that: "it is not open to the Courts to construct an 
extra-statutory concept of social justice applicable in redundancy situations".6 
This paper seeks to explore some of the implications of an earlier passage from the 
same judgment:7 
In a contract of employment workers and employers have mutual obligations of confidence, 
trust and fair dealing.  That underlies the concept of unjustifiability.  But those mutual 
obligations do not warrant the application of any different principles in the implication of 
terms and collective or individual employment contracts than are applicable to other contracts. 
  
2  John A G Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (5 ed, Fontana, London, 1997). 
3  Associated Newspapers Ltd v Wilson [1995] [1995] 2 AC 454 (HL) 
4  Brighouse Limited v Bilderbeck [1995] 1 NZLR 158 (CA). 
5  Aoraki Corporation Limited v McGavin [1998] 3 NZLR 276 (CA). 
6  Brighouse Limited v Bilderbeck, above, 169 
7  Brighouse Limited v Bilderbeck, above, 169. 
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That comment would not have divided the Brighouse Court, but may well have failed to 
win applause from any employer readership (at least if the implications were fully 
understood).  Clearly, the modern judicial invention of an implied obligation of mutual 
trust and confidence is the construction of an extra statutory concept of social justice.  
Indeed, it has been seized upon by some enthusiastic commentators as a broad and flexible 
constraint on employers.  One of these commentators, Douglas Brodie, has described the 
implied obligation as the most significant common law development in this field, and 
capable of embracing "democratic considerations of participative communitarianism".  
Whatever that means, it is not advocating judicial restraint: "The open-textured nature of 
the term makes it an ideal conduit through which the Courts can channel their views as to 
how the employment relationship should operate".8 
Much of this paper comprises a review of the case-law of the past quarter century on 
the implied term of trust and confidence in employment.  One view might assert that the 
review shows the judicial role being performed in a modern and meaningful way.  The 
judges have taken a lead from legislative intervention in rebalancing the employment 
relationship, recognised that such relationships are far removed from major commercial 
contracts, recognised also that employment is more than a contractual exchange of labour 
for wages, and utilised the common law tool of implied contractual terms accordingly.  At 
the end of this incremental and progressive process, fairness has been enhanced, the 
potential for abuse of employer power curbed, and the sum total of human happiness 
increased.  This, it might be asserted, is the adaptive and creative genius of the common 
law at work. 
A less triumphalist view might assert that, in this field, the judges have failed to 
acknowledge the commonsense of the classical common law; that, without regard to the 
economic and commercial realities of the modern enterprise, they have indulged in liberal 
generalisations (not least English judges whose career paths are almost perfectly calculated 
to avoid serious contact with employment); and that they have done little but increase the 
costs of dismissal (and perhaps increase the level of unemployment).  Perhaps most 
disturbing on this view is the failure of the judges to engage in addressing the numerous 
questions about employment and contract law that have been begged along the way of this 
25 year saga. 
It is appropriate to attempt to set out at this point some of the underlying premises of 
the latter view, which intrudes unashamedly into this paper: 
  
8  Douglas Brodie "The Hearth of the Matter: Mutual Trust and Confidence" (1996) 25 ILJ 121, 126 
quoted in Douglas Brodie "Mutual Trust and the Values of the Employment Contract" (2001) 30 
ILJ 84, 85. 
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(1) A fundamental feature of our society is the concept of the rule of law, which in 
part implies that rules which are enforceable through public agencies (in 
particular, the courts) are accessible in advance so as to enable those expected to 
comply with such rules to shape their conduct accordingly; 
(2) A second fundamental feature of our society is the independence of the judiciary 
from political pressures, which is reflected in a practical absence of political 
accountability of the courts for their performance in exercising judicial powers; 
(3) In the context of those features, the judicial role is that of maintaining and 
applying the rule of law in deciding cases which fall for determination.  In so 
doing the judiciary maintains the political legitimacy of legal rules and of the 
exercise of judicial power; 
(4) The primary institutions engaged in changing publicly enforceable rules are the 
legislature; those who prepare and promote new or amending legislation; and 
those exercising delegated legislative power to make secondary legislation; 
(5) While there are substantial areas of judge-made rules, and amendment of those by 
way of clarification and rational restatement is expected and legitimate, the judicial 
law-making role is necessarily modest; and 
(6) In particular, insofar as any judicial law-making may be expected to have a range 
of consequences for a variety of persons not parties to the immediate dispute, the 
narrow focus of the adversarial process and the related limits on the information 
available to judges mean that judicial generalisations ought to be advanced only 
on a consistently precautionary basis. 
In what follows, the focus on the implied employment obligation of trust and 
confidence permits some consideration of the nature of the employment relationship, of 
the modern law of contract, and of the judicial law-making role.9   
II THE COMMON LAW OF "MASTER AND SERVANT" 
For historical perspective there is some value in revisiting the common law of 
employment from the early part of the 20th century.  A useful point of reference is the first 
edition of The Laws of England.10 
  
9  It is a narrow focus and of course in no way seeks to minimise Sir Ivor's judicial work across the 
board, including virtually every aspect of employment law, and in relation to four separate 
legislative employment regimes: the Industrial Relations Act 1973; the Labour Relations Act 1987; 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991; and the Employment Relations Act 2000. 
10  Being a complete statement of the whole law of England, edited by the Earl of Halsbury, Lord 
Chancellor for three periods between 1885 and 1905.  Volume 20 of this work was published in 
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In the first edition of Halsbury we find the following propositions: 
(1) Any person of ordinary contractual capacity is competent to enter into a contract 
of hiring and service either as employer or employed; 
(2) The essential feature of the relation of master and servant is the employer's power 
not only to direct what work the servant is to do, but also the manner in which 
the work is to be done (the distinction between servants on the one hand, and 
independent contractors or volunteers — often family — on the other); 
(3) It is an implied term of the contract of service that a servant takes upon himself 
the risks incidental to his employment; 
(4) It is the duty of the servant to obey the master's lawful orders and to serve him 
faithfully; 
(5) There is an implied term that the servant must act in good faith towards his 
master, extending to use of confidential information obtained from the employer 
during the employment; 
(6) A contract of hiring and service is presumed to be for a year (citing Blackstone's 
reference to the "Natural Equity, that the servant shall serve, and master maintain 
him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well when there is 
work to be done as when there is not"); 
(7) A general hiring which operates as a hiring for a year can only be terminated with 
a current year, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary (but there is a custom in 
domestic service that a general hiring may be terminated at any time by a month's 
notice or payment of a month's wages); 
(8) If no custom or stipulation as to notice exists, and if the contract of service is not 
one which can be regarded as yearly hiring, the service is terminable by a 
reasonable notice (citing cases holding that six months was reasonable for 
newspaper editors, sub-editors and foreign correspondents; three months for 
commercial travellers, clerks in the superior positions, governesses and school 
mistresses; and one month for a head gardener, a clerk in a telegraph office, and a 
farm bailiff);  
(9) Wilful disobedience to the lawful and reasonable order of the master justifies 
summary dismissal (extending to conduct outside employment of an immoral or 
untrustworthy nature, including fathering or mothering a bastard child); 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1911, and includes the topic "Master and Servant". This topic takes up some 220 pages of text, of 
which some 115 pages are devoted to the liability of the master in case of accidents. 
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(10) Whether the summary dismissal of a servant is justified or not is a question of fact 
to be determined by a jury; and 
(11) A servant is justified in terminating his engagement if he has a reasonable 
apprehension of danger to life or of personal injury as a result of continuing the 
work, when the master has failed to carry out his part of the contract, or where he 
is subjected to severe ill-treatment. 
Several of those propositions seem archaic a century or so later, not least the language 
of "master" and "servant" itself.  Yet perhaps it is too easy to write off those propositions 
because of the language, and the examples.  Much remains the same.  Notably, employers 
and employees are generally free to enter into employment contracts, subject to anti-
discrimination and minimum conditions legislation (and collective employment 
agreements); and the employment contract remains distinct from partnership, agency, 
independent contractor and purely voluntary transactions. 
Such was the legal context in which the House of Lords delivered its decision in Addis v 
Gramophone Company Limited.11  Mr Addis was employed as the manager of the 
Gramophone Company's business in Calcutta, earning £15 per week as salary, and entitled 
to a commission on the trade done, but able to be dismissed on six months' notice.  He was 
given six months' notice in October 1905, but the employer appointed his successor to act 
immediately, and took steps to prevent Mr Addis from acting further as manager, with the 
result that in December 1905 Mr Addis returned to England and brought an action for 
breach of contract.  The case was heard before (the notorious) Justice Darling, and a jury.  
The jury awarded Mr Addis £600 for wrongful dismissal, and £340 for lost commission. 
The House of Lords, by a 5:1 majority, held that there was a breach of contract in not 
allowing Mr Addis to discharge his duties as manager, but the damages were limited to 
the salary for the six months from his receiving notice, together with the commission 
which he would have earned had he been allowed to manage the business himself during 
that period.  The majority rejected the proposition that the manner of dismissal could affect 
the damages, notwithstanding that (in the words of Lord Shaw) the employer had acted in 
a "sharp and oppressive" manner which was highly damaging to Mr Addis in the 
commercial community of Calcutta. 
What became known as the "rule in Addis v Gramophone Company" was taken from the 
law reporter's headnote: 
Where a servant is wrongfully dismissed from his employment the damages for the dismissal 
cannot include compensation for the manner of the dismissal, for his injured feelings, or for 
  
11  Addis v Gramophone Company Limited [1909] AC 488 (HL). 
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the loss he may sustain from the fact that the dismissal itself makes it more difficult for him to 
obtain fresh employment. 
It is hard to escape the conclusion that, by the late-twentieth century, Addis had 
become a symbol of a harshly pro-employer bias in the common law, suitable for 
enlightened law reform.  The writer must accept a primary responsibility for one variant of 
this, the Law Commission's report, Aspects of Damages.12  
III THE EMERGENCE OF THE IMPLIED TERM 
At the risk of sweeping generalisations, but in the interest of economy of expression, it 
may be permissible to summarise the relevant context from the first three quarters of the 
twentieth century in the following observations: 
(1) The predominant emphasis of employment law in New Zealand and in the United 
Kingdom was on collective bargaining within supportive legislative regimes; 
(2) In this context, the ordinary Courts had little role to play but remained the subject 
of suspicion from trade unions; 
(3) For most of this period, the general Courts gave great weight to the doctrine of 
precedent, and there was relatively little "development" or "expansion" of common 
law rules; 
(4) The House of Lords' 1966 Practice Statement, indicating a willingness to depart 
from precedent when it was "right to do so" to further the proper development of 
the law, unleashed a potential for judicial creativity which was realised in the 
common law of the Commonwealth in the last quarter of the 20th century; 
(5) By the 1970s a major expansion of the judicial role in reviewing administrative 
actions had occurred, and judges had won much academic (and some public) 
acclaim for redressing the imbalance between the State on the one hand and 
individual parties on the other, in part under the label "fairness".  Some parallel 
developments had taken place in commercial law with the resurrection of 
equitable concepts to avoid perceived inequities in the application of common law 
rules in particular cases; and 
(6) By the late-1970s the post-World War Two economic confidence of the "Western" 
world, and unquestioning acceptance of a liberal welfare state, had been shaken by 
two "oil shocks".  A generation of broad political consensus was perceived by 
  
12  New Zealand Law Commission Employment Contracts and the Rule in Addis v Gramophone Co R18 
(Wellington, 1991).  The present paper is more concerned with judicial variants, not least the 
House of Lords' decisions in Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) 
[1998] AC 20 [1997] 3 WLR 95 and Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13, [2001] 2 WLR 1076. 
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many as ending with the election of a Conservative government in the United 
Kingdom, led by Margaret Thatcher, in 1979, and of a Republican President, 
Ronald Reagan, in the United States in 1980. 
IV WESTERN EXCAVATING 
The story of the modern trust and confidence implied term sensibly commences with 
Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp.13  The issue was whether an employee asserting 
breach of a statutory "right not to be unfairly dismissed", by way of a "constructive" 
dismissal (a resignation driven by the employer's conduct) had to show that the employer's 
conduct was repudiatory (showing the employer no longer intended to be bound by the 
contract) or merely unreasonable.  The Court of Appeal held that repudiatory conduct had 
to be shown if the employee were to succeed.  Lord Denning MR observed that the 
"unreasonable conduct" test was "too indefinite by far". 
The court's judgments indicate a lack of appellate endorsement of the Industrial 
Tribunal majority's "whimsical" view that the employer "ought to have leant over 
backwards" to help the employee.  And Lawton LJ observed that:14 
For the purpose of this judgment, I do not find it either necessary or advisable to express any 
opinion as to what principles of law operate to bring a contract of employment to an end by 
reason of an employer's conduct.  Sensible persons have no difficulty in recognising such 
conduct when they hear about it.  ...  I appreciate that the principles of law applicable to the 
termination by an employee of a contract of employment because of his employer's conduct 
are difficult to put concisely in the language judges use in court.  Lay members of industrial 
tribunals, however, do not spend all their time in court and when out of court they may use, 
and certainly will hear, short words and terse phrases which describe clearly the kind of 
employer of whom an employee is entitled without notice to rid himself. 
A Courtaulds 
A little over a year later, a Mr Andrew contributed his claim to a place in legal history.  
In Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew,15 his constructive dismissal claim was upheld 
on the basis that, through the assistant manager telling him "You can't do the bloody job 
anyway" (which was not a true expression of his opinion), the employer had breached a 
fundamental term of the contract.16 
  
13  Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] 1 QB 761 (CA). 
14  Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd, above, 772. 
15  Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew [1979] IRLR 84 (EAT). 
16  Courtaulds Northern Textiles v Andrew [1979] IRLR 84, 85-86. 
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The contract, as we have already mentioned, was a contract partly expressed (though we have 
not dealt with the expressed terms or indeed had our attention drawn to them) and partly, as 
must always be the case, consisting of implied terms.  The test must be, as we think, that one 
implies into a contract of this sort such additional terms as are necessary to give it commercial 
and industrial validity.  One of the ways in which it is put forward in the cross-notice by the 
solicitors for Mr Andrew is to say that it was an implied term of the contract that the 
employers would not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct themselves in a manner 
calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust 
between the parties.  That term is really criticised on behalf of the employers only in one 
regard — they say that 'calculated' (in addition to 'likely') casts the net rather too wide, in that 
it might involve there being a breach of the implied term where the likelihood was wholly, or 
at any rate partly, attributable to circumstances for which the employers were not responsible.  
But we do not read it thus.  We think that, thus phrased, the implied term (as regards 
'calculated') extends only to an obligation not to conduct themselves in such a manner as is 
intended, although not intended by itself, to destroy or seriously damage the relationship in 
question.  It is confined in those terms and it does not seem to us to be stated too widely. 
Now it is of course true, applying the Court of Appeal's test, that in order to decide that the 
conduct is sufficiently repudiatory to justify a conclusion of constructive dismissal one has to 
consider whether the conduct complained of constitutes either a fundamental breach of the 
contract or a breach of a fundamental term of the contract: two somewhat elusive conceptions 
which figure in our modern contract law.  But there is not much room, as we think, for that 
inquiry in a case in which the test, within the terms of the contractual obligation, is one which 
involves considering whether the consequences, or the likely consequences, are to destroy or 
seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee; 
because it does seem to us that any conduct which is likely to destroy or seriously to damage 
that relationship must be something which goes to the root of the contract, which is really 
fundamental in its effect upon the contractual relationship. 
Courtaulds did not proceed to the Court of Appeal, and several questions remain 
unanswered.  Why was the term "necessary" to give "commercial and industrial validity" 
to employment contracts?  Was there any credible evidence as to such necessity?  Why did 
the employer's lawyers essentially accept the implied term asserted by the employee's 
lawyers?  What does the term actually mean?  How is it any less "indefinite" than that 
rejected in Western Excavating? 
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B The Woods case 
Although not the first formulation, the standard citation for the implied term is Woods v 
W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd.17 Lord Denning MR explained the facts of the case as 
follows: 
Mr Todd built up a successful garage business at Deeping St James near Peterborough.  He 
was 63 and decide to retire.  He arranged to sell it to an up-and-coming company in the same 
line.  The price was £220,000.  The new management said they would take over the staff on the 
same terms as with Mr Todd.  The price was fixed on that basis.  But then Mr Todd — without 
telling the purchasers — increased the pay of some of the staff.  One of them was his personal 
secretary, Mrs Woods.  She had been with him for 28 years and was described as 'Chief 
Secretary and Accounts Clerk'.  She earned £68.68 gross for a 35-hour week. 
The takeover took place on 14.1.80.  The new management got on well with most of the staff.  
They had no complaints.  But they thought that Mrs Woods was rated too highly and that she 
was being paid too much for the work she did.  So they tried to persuade her to take less or to 
work longer hours.  She resented this.  She refused.  They gave in.  Much friction arose.  She 
went to solicitors.  They told her to keep a note of anything untoward that took place.  She did 
so.  Over the next four months there were several incidents.  It would be tedious to go through 
them.  They seem trivial to an outsider but both parties magnified them out of all proportions.  
All trust and confidence was lost on both sides.  Finally, only four months after the takeover, 
on 14.5.80, her solicitors advised her to leave. 
So the case went before the Industrial Tribunal.  The question was whether she had been 
'dismissed' by her employers.  The statutory definition of dismissal includes constructive 
dismissal.  It says in s55(2)(c) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 that an 
employee shall be deemed to be dismissed by his employer if, and only if, 
'the employee terminates that contract, with or without notice, in circumstances such 
that he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct'. 
The Industrial Tribunal rejected Mrs Woods' claim on the basis that the work she was 
being required to do was within the terms of her contract, and that none of the employer's 
actions taken in isolation amounted to a repudiatory breach of the employment contract.  
That Tribunal also held that the cumulative effect of the employer's actions did not amount 
to a breach of an implied term that the employers would not without reasonable and 
proper cause conduct themselves in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously 
damage the relationship of confidence and trust between the parties. 
  
17  Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666 (EAT); [1982] ICR 693, 697 (EWCA). 
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The matter then went before the Employment Appeal Tribunal, presided over by 
Browne-Wilkinson J (as he then was), sitting with two lay members.  The judgment, 
delivered by the judge, dismissed the appeal, but expressed reservations as to whether the 
first instance tribunal had, as a matter of fact, got the right answer on the implied term.  As 
to the implied term itself, the judgment said:18 
In our view it is clearly established that there is implied in a contract of employment a term 
that the employers will not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct themselves in a 
manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and 
trust between employer and employee:  Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew [1979] IRLR 
84.  To constitute a breach of this implied term, it is not necessary to show that the employer 
intended any repudiation of the contract: the Tribunal's function is to look at the employer's 
conduct as a whole and determine whether it is such that its effect, judged reasonably and 
sensibly, is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with it. 
We regard this implied term as one of great importance in good industrial relations.  Quite 
apart from the inherent desirability of requiring both employer and employee to behave in the 
way required by such a term, there is a more technical reason for its importance. 
…  Experience in this Appeal Tribunal has shown that one of the consequences of the decision 
in the Western Excavating case has been that employers who wish to get rid of an employee or 
alter the terms of his employment without becoming liable either to pay compensation for 
unfair dismissal or a redundancy payment have had resort to methods of "squeezing out" an 
employee.  Stopping short of any major breach of the contract, such an employer attempts to 
make the employee's life so uncomfortable that he resigns or accepts the revised terms.  Such 
an employer, having behaved in a totally unreasonable manner, then claims that he has not 
repudiated the contract and therefore that the employee has no statutory right to claim either a 
redundancy payment or compensation for unfair dismissal. 
It is for this reason that we regard the implied term we have referred to as being of such 
importance.  In our view, an employer who persistently attempts to vary an employee's 
conditions of service (whether contractual or not) with a view to getting rid of the employee or 
varying the employee's terms of service does act in a manner calculated or likely to destroy the 
relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee.  Such employer has 
therefore breached the implied term. 
Although the Employment Appeal Tribunal felt unable to interfere with the Industrial 
Tribunal's rejection of Mrs Woods' claim, it stated expressly that, if the matter were for it to 
decide, it would have held that there was breach of this implied term:  the employer's 
  
18  See British Aircraft Corp v Austin [1978] IRLR 332 (EAT) and Post Office v Roberts [1980] IRLR 347. 
(EAT).  The conduct of the parties has to be looked at as a whole and its cumulative impact 
assessed:  Post Office v Roberts para 50. 
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actions "were directed to inducing Mrs Woods to accept a change in her terms of service".  
In other words, the employer's breach involved persistence, rather than unscrupulous 
conduct. 
When the matter went to the Court of Appeal, Mrs Woods' appeal was dismissed on 
the basis that the Employment Appeal Tribunal had rightly deferred to the first instance 
Tribunal's conclusion on what was essentially a matter of fact. 
On the implied term, Lord Denning MR favoured a "good and considerate" obligation 
binding on employers:19 
It is the duty of the employer to be good and considerate to his servants.  Sometimes it is 
formulated as an implied term not to do anything likely to destroy the relationship of 
confidence between them, see Courtaulds Textiles v Andrew [1979] IRLR 84.  But I prefer to look 
at it in this way:  the employer must be good and considerate to his servants.  Just as a servant 
must be good and faithful, so an employer must be good and considerate.  Just as in the old 
days an employee could be guilty of misconduct justifying his dismissal, so in modern times 
an employer can be guilty of misconduct justifying the employee in leaving at once without 
notice.  In each case it depends on whether the misconduct amounted to a repudiatory breach 
as defined in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] IRLR 27.    
Lord Justice Watkins did not address the implied term directly, but indicated much 
sympathy for the employer's position:20 
Misunderstandings between employer and employee had in the last analysis produced a state 
of affairs which would have prevented the employer from exercising properly his discretion if 
not his right to reorganise his business.  The obdurate refusal of the appellant to accept 
conditions very properly and sensibly being sought to be imposed upon her was 
unreasonable. Employers must not, in my opinion, be put in a position where, through the 
wrongful refusal of their employees to accept change, they are prevented from introducing 
improved business methods in furtherance of seeking success for their enterprise. 
The third member of the Court of Appeal, Fox LJ, simply noted that the Industrial 
Tribunal had devoted four days to the hearing and their opinion on whether the 
employer's conduct was, in the circumstances, likely to be destructive of confidence and 
trust between employer and employee, carried weight. 
It seems clear that in Woods the Employment Appeal Tribunal wished to provide a 
remedy for "unfair" employer behaviour preceding a resignation.  The implied term 
enabled the bypassing of the difficulty created by Western Excavating.  Again, there are 
  
19  Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666 (EAT); [1982] ICR 693, 702 (EWCA). 
20  Woods, above, 707. 
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unanswered questions.  What evidence was there of the "inherent desirability" of such a 
term?  What consideration was given to the costs generally of the term, to be weighed 
against a remedy for "squeezing out" actions by some employees?  What was the term 
thought to mean?  If Mrs Woods had persistently sought higher wages or shorter hours, 
would that have amounted to repudiation of the contract?  And why did the Court of 
Appeal lose sight of the "indefinite" issue recognised in Western Excavating? 
C Court of Appeal endorsement 
While the Court of Appeal's decision in Woods was a less than clear-cut endorsement of 
Browne-Wilkinson J's formulation of the implied term, that formula was treated as settled 
law in two 1985 Court of Appeal decisions.21 Notably, Bliss involved a common law 
contract, not regulated by employment legislation. 
Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson featured again in the story when, as Vice-Chancellor, in 
Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco,22 he restated his Woods implied term as 
"the implied obligation of good faith".  He suggested that a claim of breach of good faith by 
an employer, in a pension context, could be made as a matter of contract and/or of trust 
law.  In any event, the "good faith" implied term has enjoyed an expanding career to date. 
V THE IMPLIED TERM IN NEW ZEALAND 
In Schilling v Kidd Garrett Limited23 the Court of Appeal accepted (as was common 
ground between the parties) that there was a term implied into the relevant contract of 
employment that the employee would serve the employer "with good faith and fidelity", 
following Robb v Green.24  Both Schilling and Robb were concerned with the situation where 
an employee sought to use information and opportunities derived from their former 
employment in commercial activity, either for themselves or for a new employer, 
following termination of that employment. 
The Industrial Relations Act 1973 introduced the language of "personal grievance", 
defined to include both unjustifiable dismissal and other actions (not affecting all 
employees of the same class) disadvantageous to an employee.  With the 1987 legislation 
(re-enacted in the 1991 and 2000 legislation), the "unjustifiable" object was explicitly 
applied to lesser disadvantageous actions affecting an employee. 
  
21  Bliss v South East Thames RHA [1987] ICR 700 (EWCA); and Lewis v Motorworld Garages Ltd [1986] 
ICR 157 (EWCA). 
22  Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco [1991] 1 WLR 589 (EWHC). 
23  Schilling v Kidd Garrett Limited [1977] 1 NZLR 243 (EWCA). 
24  Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 315 (EWCA). 
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The concept of "unjustifiable" was elaborated in a 1982 Court of Appeal decision which 
continues to have a profound effect upon employment contracts and dismissals in New 
Zealand.  In Auckland City Council v Hennessey,25 the Court held that "unjustifiable" 
dismissal extended to procedural inadequacies associated with the decision to dismiss.  Mr 
Hennessey was employed as a carpark attendant, and took exception to the speed at which 
two motorcyclists entered the carpark.  Following remonstrations, and allegedly after one 
of the motorcyclists had thrown a punch at him, he struck one of the motorcyclists with his 
fist.  The Arbitration Court took the view that his actions justified some disciplinary 
measure by his employer, but that the dismissal was unjustified because he was not given 
a full opportunity to defend his actions prior to the dismissal notice being issued, and 
irrespective of the employer's point that he had cautioned Mr Hennessey on an earlier 
occasion about taking the law into his own hands. 
 In delivering the judgment of the Court (Cooke, McMullin and Somers JJ), and 
notwithstanding the common law use of "justified" (see Halsbury, first edition, above), 
Somers J said: 
It is plain, and the contrary was not suggested, that the word "unjustifiably" in s117(1) of the 
New Zealand Act is not confined to matters of legal justification.  If it were so the section 
would add only a claim to reinstatement to the law.  In the context of s117 we think the word 
"unjustified" should have its ordinary accepted meaning. 
Its integral feature is the word unjust — that is to say not in accordance with justice or fairness.  
A course of action is unjustifiable when that which is done cannot be shown to be in accord 
with justice or fairness. 
It follows that a dismissal may be held unjustifiable where the circumstances are such that 
justice or fairness requires that the employee should have an opportunity, which he has not 
been afforded, of stating his case. 
In April 1985 the Court of Appeal (Woodhouse P, Cooke and Richardson JJ) delivered 
judgment in Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Limited.26  This was 
essentially a constructive dismissal case, and came before the Court of Appeal on a case 
stated.  The result was that the matter was referred back to the Arbitration Court to 
consider (or reconsider) whether the employer's inquiry, into whether the employee had 
failed to put money received from a customer into a supermarket checkout till, had been 
conducted "in a fair and reasonable manner towards the worker". 
  
25  Auckland City Council v Hennessey [1982] ACJ 699. 
26  Auckland Shop Employees Union v Woolworths (NZ) Limited [1985] 2 NZLR 372 (CA). 
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The Woolworths decision does not cite Hennessey, but the Court's judgment (delivered 
by Cooke J) quotes extensively from the judgment of Browne-Wilkinson J in Woods, and 
also from Lord Denning's judgment in Woods.  Then came a relatively tentative 
formulation:27 
It may well be that in New Zealand a term recognising that there ought to be a relationship of 
confidence and trust is implied as a normal incident of the relationship of employer and 
employee.  It would be a corollary of the employee's duty of fidelity. See Schilling v Kidd 
Garrett Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 243 (CA).  No formulation of duties in general terms can relieve a 
tribunal from assessing the overall seriousness of the particular conduct about which a 
complaint is made.  And the seriousness of any breach of an employer's duties will often be 
important in deciding whether a resignation was in substance a dismissal.  But the term 
favoured by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in England is, with respect, at least somewhat 
less nebulous than Lord Denning's later wording.  In this case, however, we do not have the 
benefit of the Arbitration Court's view on how best to define an implied term so as to serve the 
needs of industrial relations in New Zealand.  Therefore it is preferable that we should not 
now state a final opinion on that general question. 
What can be said without doubt is that there must at least be an implied term or a duty 
binding an employer, if conducting an inquiry into possible dishonesty by an employee, to 
carry out the inquiry in a fair and reasonable manner.  We so hold.  It may be seen as part of a 
wider duty as already discussed, or as an application of natural justice to contemporary 
industrial relations, or perhaps most naturally as combining both ideas. 
Later that year, in a case not governed by the Industrial Relations Act 1973, Marlborough 
Harbour Board v Goulden,28 Cooke J delivered a judgment (on behalf of himself and 
Richardson and Tompkins JJ) stating, again tentatively:29 
[T]his Court accepted that in the sphere governed by the Industrial Relations Act 1973 the 
relationship of confidence and trust that ought to exist between employer and employee 
imports duties on both sides, including a duty on the part of the employer, if carrying out an 
inquiry preceding a resignation or dismissal (in that case on the ground of possible 
dishonesty), to do so in a fair and reasonable manner.  Perhaps a similar implication might 
quite readily be found in private contracts of employment not subject to the 1973 Act.  Fair and 
reasonable treatment is so generally expected today of any employer that the law may come to 
recognise it as an ordinary obligation in a contract of service. 
  
27  Auckland Shop Employees Union, above, 376. 
28  Marlborough Harbour Board v Goulden [1985] 2 NZLR 378 (CA). 
29  Auckland Shop Employees Union, above, 383. 
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This approach was reflected in the Court of Appeal's restatement of the criteria for a 
justifiable summary dismissal for misconduct in Airline Stewards IUW v Air New Zealand 
Ltd.30  The Court of Appeal (per Bisson J, for himself, Richardson and Somers JJ) said: 
The employer must have more than mere suspicion but need not have proof beyond 
reasonable doubt of an actual offence by the employee.  Good working relations depend on 
loyalty and confidence, both ways as between employer and employee.  Once the employee 
destroys that relationship to the extent that the employer has reasonable grounds to believe 
there has been misconduct by the employee then, depending on the gravity of the situation, 
dismissal may be justifiable.  Similarly, if an employer destroys that relationship by dismissing 
the employee without reasonable grounds for believing there has been misconduct by the 
employee, then the employee's dismissal is not justifiable and the employee has a remedy in 
the personal grievance provisions of the Act. 
The decision which apparently entrenched the Woods implied term in New Zealand 
law was that of the Court of Appeal (Cooke P, Hardie Boys and Fisher JJ) in Auckland 
Electric Power Board v Auckland Local Authorities Officers IUW.  The judgment of the Court 
was delivered by Cooke P, and stated:31 
As to the duties of an employer, there are a number potentially relevant in this field.  How 
some should be defined precisely is a matter no doubt still open to debate:  see the discussion 
in Auckland Shop Employees case.  But in our view it can now safely be said in New Zealand 
law that one relevant implied term is that stated in the judgment of the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal, delivered by Browne-Wilkinson J, in Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) Limited 
quoted in the Auckland Shop Employees case. 
VI FROM HALE TO COUTTS MOTORS, AND "GOOD FAITH" ... 
The implied term, or some variant of it, surfaces in a line of important redundancy 
cases decided by the Court of Appeal (and in which Sir Ivor Richardson participated).  The 
first of these was G N Hale & Son Limited v Wellington Caretakers IUW.32  In a concurring 
judgment, Richardson J noted that redundancy was a difficulty area of labour law, raising 
considerations of "economic efficiency, individual autonomy and social justice". 
The Hale decision provided a relatively rare explicit judicial recognition of the 
employer's entitlement to manage the enterprise.  In the words of Richardson J:33 
  
30  Airline Stewards IUW v Air New Zealand Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 549. 
31  Auckland Electric Power Board v Auckland Local Authorities Officers IUW  [1994] 2 NZLR 415, 419 
(CA). 
32  G N Hale & Son Limited v Wellington Caretakers IUW [1991] 1 NZLR 151, 157 (CA). 
33  G N Hale & Son Limited v Wellington Caretakers IUW, above, 157. 
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The Court is able to test the genuineness of the claim that the dismissal was for redundancy 
reasons.  However, the right of the employer to manage its business, which is specifically 
recognised in many awards and agreements is not made subject, and should not be construed 
as being subject to the further fetter that it is exerciseable only in those redundancy situations 
where the business has to close its doors, or its economic survival compels it to dismiss those 
workers.  If for genuine commercial reasons the employer concludes that a worker is surplus 
to its needs, it is not for the Courts or the unions or workers to substitute their business 
judgment for the employer's. 
Again, it is not the function of the Courts to construct an overriding extra-statutory concept of 
social justice applicable in redundancy situations. 
On the implied term, Richardson J had earlier referred to unjustifiable dismissal as:34 
an elusive concept.  The underlying inquiry must be whether or not what was done and how it 
was done can be justified in the particular circumstances having due regard to the special 
importance attached under the Labour Relations Act to the relations between workers and 
employers and to any mutual obligations of confidence, trust and fair dealing (see Auckland 
Shopping Employees Union … and Marlborough Harbour Board …). 
The implication of terms into employment contracts was the subject of the decision in 
Attorney-General v New Zealand Post Primary Teachers Association.35  The judgment of the 
five judge Court (Cooke P, Richardson, Hardie Boys, Gault and McKay JJ) was delivered 
by Gault J, who said: 
For present purposes it is sufficient to say that the authorities relied upon in [two Employment 
Court] judgments do not dictate the application of any different principles to the implication 
of terms in collective or individual employment contracts than are applicable to other 
contracts. 
It can be said immediately that the nature of employment contracts will affect the content of 
implied terms (such as duties of fairness, confidence and trust) but that does not call for any 
different test for implication in such contracts.  Similarly the jurisdiction may justify a less 
rigid approach to evidence in satisfaction of the various tests but that should not detract from 
the tests. 
There is no established basis for the implication into employment contracts of terms that the 
parties have not agreed should be binding conditions of engagement for the reason simply 
that it would be reasonable to do so. 
  
34  The qualifying words "any mutual obligations" may be noted. 
35  Attorney-General v New Zealand Post Primary Teachers Association [1992] 2 NZLR 209, 213 (CA). 
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As will be apparent from the cases already cited, there is some tension within the 
jurisprudence as to whether (or to what extent) employment contracts are like other 
contracts, or are different.  In Telecom South Limited v Post Office Unions, Richardson J 
said 36
 manage and to make their own commercial decisions as to how to run their 
ntioned, the fourth step of Richardson J's 
"principled ap 37
 terms in 
nclusion that by 
reference to 38
t of one of the parties and extending to the payment of 
:  
Clearly Parliament has departed from the common law approach not only in relation to 
procedures and remedies but also in formulating the basic concept of unjustifiable conduct 
within the employment relationship under the Act.  The contract of employment cannot be 
equated with an ordinary commercial contract.  It is a special relationship under which 
workers and employers have mutual obligations of confidence, trust and fair dealing.  The 
statutory enquiry necessarily involves a balancing of competing considerations.  Those mutual 
obligations must respect on the one hand the importance to workers of the right to work and 
their legitimate interest in job security, and on the other hand the importance to employers of 
the right to
businesses. 
Returning to Brighouse, and as earlier me
proach to redundancy" stated:  
In a contract of employment, workers and employers have mutual obligations of confidence, 
trust and fair dealing.  That underlies the concept of unjustifiability.  Those mutual obligations 
do not warrant the application of any different principles to the implication of
collective or individual employment contracts than are applicable to other contracts. 
In his dissenting judgment in Brighouse, Gault J found no assistance in resorting to 
implied contractual terms to interpret the word "unjustified".  He went on to say that he 
saw logical inconsistency between the PPTA decision's rejection of reasonableness as a 
criterion for implying terms into employment contracts, and any co
"the duty of good faith" there could be an implication of:  
an obligation of fair dealing such as embodies whatever the Court or Tribunal considers to be 
fair or reasonable on the par
compensation for redundancy. 
In his judgment in Brighouse, Cooke P described the implied term, derived from Woods, 
as a "pervading obligation" and "a staple of New Zealand industrial law", which had been 
  
tion, above, 213. 
R 158, 181 (CA). 
36  Telecom South Limited v Post Office Unions [1992] 1 ERNZ 711, 722. 
37 Attorney-General v New Zealand Post Primary Teachers Associa
38  Brighouse Limited v Bilderbeck [1995] 1 NZL
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rep op 
Em
not even mention them.  Similarly, one can 
g, 
wh
f interpretation of contracts apply to employment contracts under the 
l 
app
f case is that a contract of 
ers and employers have mutual 
ry, but because such a term meets the criteria 
even step discussion of the statutory scheme for unjustifiable 
dis p, 
the
 
eatedly recognised and enforced in the line of cases running from Auckland Sh
ployees to Auckland Electric Power Board.  He went on to observe that:39 
That fundamental principle in employment is not and was not intended to be affected by the 
decision of this Court in Attorney-General v New Zealand Post Primary Teachers Association … 
[which] of course said nothing in derogation of the abovementioned line of decisions based on 
the fundamental general principle.  Indeed, it did 
feel confident that the policy-makers responsible for the Employment Contracts Act 1991 can 
have had no intention of subverting the principle. 
A different emphasis was found in Principal of Auckland College of Education v Hag
ere Richardson P (writing for four members of the Court of Appeal) said:40 
The general principles o
Employment Contracts Act 1991.  There is not a different or special set of rules applicable to 
employment contracts. 
The same judgment went to note the role of "commercial reality" in the modern judicia
roach to interpretation of contracts, and observed that:41 
An important element of commercial reality in this class o
employment has a special relationship under which work
obligations of confidence, trust and fair dealing (Telecom South). 
In his concurring judgment in Hagg, Thomas J said:42 
Other than as may be provided in the statute, the ordinary principles of contract law apply to 
such contracts.  The requirement of fair dealing, for instance, is implied into employment 
contracts, not because they are in a special catego
for the implication of terms in contracts under the general law. Employment contracts are not 
covered by a special or separate law of contract. 
In Aoraki the joint judgment of Richardson P, Gault, Henry, Keith, Blanchard and 
Tipping JJ incorporated a s
missal which incorporated two references to the implied term.  First, in the fifth ste
 judgment states that:43 
 
39  Brighouse Limited v Bilderbeck, above, 164. 
40  Principal of Auckland College of Education v Hagg [1997] 1 ERNZ 116, 126. 
41  Principal of Auckland College of Education v Hagg [1997] 1 ERNZ 116,129. 
42  Principal of Auckland College of Education v Hagg, above, 132.  See, for example A-G v NZ Post 
Primary Teachers Assn [1992] 1 ERNZ 1163, 1168; [1992] 2 NZLR 209, 213, Gault J. 
43  Aoraki Corporation Limited v McGavin [1998] 3 NZLR 276, 294 (CA) 
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A just employer, subject to the mutual obligations of confidence, trust and fair dealing, will 
Th
ual arrangement so as to impose substantive obligations, eg, as to redundancy or 
rties had not agreed to 
In h
ment relationship are bound by a broad mutual obligation of trust and confidence.  
ossessed characteristics "intrinsic to public law" and thus assisted 
the
" into, or perhaps its equation with, "good 
fait lf, 
Ric
 the dismissal the obligation of good faith and fair treatment applies.  Any failure 
 
implement the redundancy decisions in a fair and sensitive way. 
e seventh step states:44 
The contract rules and there is no basis conformable with the settled principles governing the 
implication of terms in other contracts to read in an implied obligation of that kind [ie to 
require payment of compensation when an employee becomes redundant] or to extend the 
mutual obligation of trust and fair dealing in that way.  To do this would also alter the 
substantive rights and obligations in which the parties agree; it would change the economic 
value of their overall agreement; and it would erode the statutory emphasis on the free 
negotiation of employment contracts …  The mutual obligation is directed to fair treatment in 
the employment and there is no basis of principle for converting it into a specific variation of 
the contract
pensions or long service leave or employee shares, which the pa
undertake. 
is judgment, dissenting in part, Thomas J emphasised that:45 
It is firmly established in New Zealand, following the Common Law of England, that parties to 
an employ
This duty has frequently been referred to as "the mutual obligation of trust, confidence and fair 
dealing". 
Thomas J noted the confirmation of the implied term by the House of Lords in Malik 
discussed below, but resiled from his view, expressed in Hagg, that the implied term did 
not reflect a special or separate law of contract.  Rather, he took the view that an 
employment contract p
 protection of employees against the abuse or arbitrary exercise of the power in the 
hands of an employer. 
The transformation of "trust and confidence
h" was marked in NZ Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites.46  In a judgment for himse
hardson P, Gault, Keith and Tipping JJ said: 
Where there is a genuine redundancy that will justify termination of the employment of the 
person in the position.  In the course of the employer's consideration of the position and in 
carrying out
 
44  Aoraki Corporation Limited, above, 295. 
45  Aoraki Corporation Limited, above, 304. 
46  NZ Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites [2000] 2 NZLR 565, 572 (CA). 
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to discharge that obligation that in itself is unjustifiable may result in remedies appropriate to 
the breach. 
Most recently (as at the date of writing), there has been the decision in Coutts Cars Ltd v 
Baguley,47 where the judgment of Richardson P, Gault and Blanchard JJ was delivered by 
Gault J, with Tipping J delivering a concurring judgment and McGrath J a dissenting 
judgment.48 This was an unjustifiable dismissal case under the Employment Relations Act 
2000.  The issue related to consultation over redundancy, but the majority judges (again) 
tra e 
wo
al areas such as negotiations and collective 
v  we consider the law 
ords delivered over the past decade, and the Woods implied term in two of 
tho
for a limited time period only) to purchase added years of 
 
nslated the Woods implied term as one requiring the observance of good faith.  In th
rds of Gault J:49 
In the judgment of the [majority] of the Court in Aoraki, referring to situations in which a 
genuine redundancy has arisen, it was said: 
A just employer, subject to the mutual obligations of trust confidence and fair dealing, will 
implement the redundancy in a fair and sensitive way. 
We do not see the new statutory obligation on employers and employees to deal with each 
other in good faith introduces any significantly different obligation to that the courts have 
placed upon parties to employment contracts over recent years.  Undoubtedly the duty to deal 
in good faith will have impact in addition
en ironments, but in the area with which we are presently concerned
already required the observance of good faith. 
VII MEANWHILE, BACK IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS … 
The nature of implied terms in employment was addressed in three decisions of the 
House of L
se. These decisions are outlined below.  Their merits are discussed in later sections of 
this paper. 
In Scally v Southern Heath Board50 four doctors alleged breach of contract (and 
negligence) against their employer by reason of failure to advise them of an opportunity 
(available under regulations 
 
47  Coutts Cars Ltd v Baguley [2002] 2 NZLR 533 (CA). 
48  This paper was written before delivery of the judgment in Attorney-General v Gilbert [2002] 2 
NZLR 342 (CA), which cites Johnson v Unisys Ltd (discussed below) with approval.  It was also 
written before sighting an article which explains, in terms of an "energy aesthetic" as compared to 
a "grid aesthetic", what might hitherto have been described as "judicial expansionism" and 
"judicial restraint" in discussing cases referred to in this paper:  Pierre Schlag "The Aesthetics of 
American Law" (2002) 115 Harv L Rev 1047. 
49  Baguley, above, 545. 
50  Scally v Southern Heath Board [1992] 1 AC 294 (HL). 
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pen
e basis of implying a limited term (that the employer was obliged to notify the 
pla e 
det
in a position to enjoy its benefit.  Accordingly I would 
 
sion entitlement on advantageous terms, the pension arrangements being part of their 
employment contract. 
The leading speech was delivered by Lord Bridge.  No mention was made of Woods, 
but th  
intiffs of their rights in relation to the purchase of added years) was considered in som
ail51 
Will the law then imply a term in the contract of employment imposing such an obligation on 
the employer?  The implication cannot, of course, be justified as necessary to give business 
efficacy to the contract of employment as a whole.  I think there is force in the submission that, 
since the employee's entitlement to enhance his pension rights by the purchase of added years 
is of no effect unless he is aware of it and since he cannot be expected to become aware of it 
unless it is drawn to his attention, it is necessary to imply an obligation on the employer to 
bring it to his attention to render efficacious the very benefit which the contractual right to 
purchase added years was intended to confer.  But this may be stretching the doctrine of 
implication for the sake of business efficacy beyond its proper reach.  A clear distinction is 
drawn in the speeches of Viscount Simonds in Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] 
AC 555 and Lord Wilberforce in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 between the 
search for an implied term necessary to give business efficacy to a particular contract and the 
search, based on wider considerations, for a term which the law will imply as a necessary 
incident of a definable category of contractual relationship.  If any implication is appropriate 
here, it is, I think, of this latter type.  Carswell J accepted the submission that any formulation 
of an implied term of this kind which would be effective to sustain the plaintiff's claims in this 
case must necessarily be too wide in its ambit to be acceptable as of general application.  I 
believe however that this difficulty is surmounted if the category of contractual relationship in 
which the implication will arise is defined with sufficient precision.  I would define it as the 
relationship of employer and employee where the following circumstances obtain:  (1) the 
terms of the contract of employment have not been negotiated with the individual employee 
but result from negotiation with a representative body or are otherwise incorporated by 
reference;  (2) a particular term of the contract makes available to the employee a valuable 
right contingent upon action being taken by him to avail himself of its benefit;  (3) the 
employee cannot, in all the circumstances, reasonably be expected to be aware of the term 
unless it is drawn to his attention.  I fully appreciate that the criterion to justify an implication 
of this kind is necessity, not reasonableness.  But I take the view that it is not merely 
reasonable, but necessary, in the circumstances postulated, to imply an obligation on the 
employer to take reasonable steps to bring the term of the contract in question to the 
employee's attention, so that he may be 
 
51  Scally, above, 306-307. 
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hold that there was an implied term in each of the plaintiff's contracts of employment of which 
the boards were in each case in breach. 
In Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA52 the leading speeches were 
delivered by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead and Lord Steyn, with both of whom Lords Goff, 
McKay and Mustill expressly agreed.  As the law reporter's headnote says, it was held that 
"there was an implied obligation on an employer that he would not carry on a dishonest or 
corrupt business".  Importantly, the existence of such an implied term was agreed by 
cou ere focussed on the application of such a 
term. 
hatever his 
ot to engage in conduct likely to undermine the trust and confidence required if 
manner the employment contract implicitly 
Mo
nt prospects, by harsh and oppressive behaviour or 
 
nsel for the respective parties.  Arguments w
Lord Nicholls described this obligation as:53 
... no more than a reflection of what goes without saying in any ordinary contract of 
employment, namely, that in agreeing to work for an employer the employee, w
status, cannot be taken to have agreed to work in furtherance of a dishonest business.  This is 
as much true of a doorkeeper or cleaner as a senior executive or branch manager. 
...  This implied obligation is no more than one particular aspect of the portmanteau, general 
obligation n
the employment relationship is to continue in the 
envisages. 
re generally, Lord Nicholls observed that:54 
This is an unacceptably narrow evaluation of the trust and confidence term. Employers may be 
under no common law obligation, through the medium of an implied contractual term of 
general application, to take steps to improve their employees' future job prospects. But failure 
to improve is one thing, positively to damage is another. Employment, and job prospects, are 
matters of vital concern to most people. Jobs of all descriptions are less secure than formerly, 
people change jobs more frequently, and the job market is not always buoyant. Everyone 
knows this. An employment contract creates a close personal relationship, where there is often 
a disparity of power between the parties. Frequently the employee is vulnerable. Although the 
underlying purpose of the trust and confidence term is to protect the employment 
relationship, there can be nothing unfairly onerous or unreasonable in requiring an employer 
who breaches the trust and confidence term to be liable if he thereby causes continuing 
financial loss of a nature that was reasonably foreseeable. *38 Employers must take care not to 
damage their employees' future employme
 
52  Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1998] AC 21. 
53  Malik, above, 34-35. No authority was stated for this proposition. 
54  Malik, above, 37-38. 
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by any other form of conduct which is unacceptable today as falling below the standards set 
by the implied trust and confidence term. 
In his speech, Lord Steyn commenced his discussion of the implied term by reference to 
Scally, and the proposition that the term was not implied as a matter of fact, but is a 
standardised term implied by law:  an incident of all contracts of employment, but default 
rul
g to Spring v Guardian Assurance55 and Scally, he 
obs
t e Woods implied term had evolved from the general duty 
of d 
ter
ions in which a balance has to be struck between an employer's interest 
 in any decided cases and it has been welcomed in 
list Tribunals (and for an £11,000 ceiling on damages awards).  
 
es which the parties are free to exclude or modify.  The formulation of the implied term 
was explicitly drawn from Woods. 
More generally, Lord Steyn noted that the notion of a "master and servant" relationship 
has become obsolete.  After referrin  
erved that:  "It was the change in legal culture which made possible the evolution of the 
implied term of trust and confidence".56 
Lord Steyn suggested that h
cooperation between contracting parties.  He then endorsed the validity of the implie
m in the following passage:57 
The major importance of the implied duty of trust and confidence lies in its impact on the 
obligations of the employer:  Douglas Brodie, "The Heart of the Matter:  Mutual Trust and 
Confidence" (1996) 25 I.L.J. 121.  And the implied obligation as formulated is apt to cover the 
great diversity of situat
in managing his business as he sees fit and the employee's interest in not being unfairly and 
improperly exploited. 
The evolution of the implied term of trust and confidence is a fact.  It has not yet been 
endorsed by your Lordships' House.  It has proved a workable principle in practice.  It has not 
been the subject of adverse criticism
academic writings.  I regard the emergence of the implied obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence as a sound development. 
More recently, the House of Lords revisited the implied term (and Addis, as it had in 
Malik) in Johnson v Unisys Limited.58  The majority took the view that to uphold a claim that 
summary dismissal involved a breach of the implied term would involve by-passing the 
statutory regime established by the Employment Rights Act 1996 which provided for such 
claims to be heard by specia
 
55  Spring v Guardian Assurance [1995] 2 AC 296 (HL). 
56  Malik, above, 46. 
57  Malik, above, 46. 
58  Johnson v Unisys Limited [2001] UKHL 13. 
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Thu
h  leading judgment was delivered by Lord Hoffmann.  His essential reasoning was 
tha d 
tha
mon law.  The substantive elements must be consistent with legislative 
utes.  The courts may proceed in harmony with Parliament but there 
He
nd cannot impose arbitrary limitations 
g rules based upon policy rather than principle. 
t be undermined by judicial decision-
maki
 
s the County Court Judge had correctly struck out the claim as disclosing no 
reasonable cause of action. 
T e
t the issue fell within an area covered by the legislation.  More particularly, he observe
t:59 
Employment law requires the balancing of the interest of employers and employees, with 
proper regard not only to the individual dignity and work of the employees but also to the 
general economic interest.  Subject to the observance of fundamental human rights, the point 
at which this balance should be struck is a matter of a democratic decision.  The development 
of the common law by the judges plays a subsidiary role.  The traditional function is to adapt 
and modernise the com
policy as expressed in stat
should be no discord. 
 also observed that:60 
The common law decides cases according to principle a
on liability because of the circumstances of the particular case.  Only statute can lay down 
limitin
Hence, the statutory limits on damages should no
ng. 
More generally, Lord Hoffmann observed that:61 
At common law the contract of employment was regarded by the Courts as a contract like any 
other.  The parties were free to negotiate whatever terms they liked and no terms will be 
implied unless they satisfy the strict test of necessity applied to a commercial contract.  
Freedom of contract meant that the stronger party, usually the employer, was free to impose 
his terms upon the weaker.  But over the last 30 years or so, the nature of the contract of 
employment has been transformed.  It has been recognised that a person's employment is 
usually one of the most important things in his or her life.  It gives not only a livelihood but an 
occupation, an identity and a sense of self-esteem.  The law has changed to recognise the social 
reality.  Most of the changes are being made by Parliament.  The Employment Rights Act 1996 
consolidates numerous statutes which have conferred rights upon employees.  European 
Community Law has made a substantial contribution.  And the common law has adapted 
itself to the new attitudes, preceding sometimes by analogy with statutory rights.  The 
 
59  Johnson, above, para 37 
60  Johnson, above, para 49. 
61  Johnson, above, para 35. 
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contribution of the common law to the employment revolution has been by the evolution of 
implied terms on the contract of employment.  The most far reaching is the implied term of 
trust and confidence.  But there have been others.  For example, in W A Goold (Pearmak) Limited 
v McConnell [1995] IRLR 516, Morison J (sitting in the Employment Appeal Tribunal) said that 
e was Lord Hoffmann's doubt that the implied term could be pressed 
bey
ch, Lord Millet repeated the theme that contracts of employment 
are no longer regarded as purely commercial  
agents, but not
 they would 
ered that the unfair dismissal legislation would not be 
unworkable if his view ve 
bargaining should be recognised:
 Brown, Deakin, Nash and Oxenbridge, "The 
it was an implied term of the contract of employment that an employer would reasonably and 
properly afford employees an opportunity to obtain redress of grievances. 
Also of relevanc
ond preserving the continuing relationship into the area of dismissal (and, apparently, 
beyond dismissal). 
In his concurring spee
 contracts entered into between free and equal
ed that:62 
This change of perception is, of course, partly due to the creation by Parliament of the 
statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed.  If this right had not existed, however, it is 
possible that the Courts would have fashion a similar remedy of common law, that
have proceeded by implying appropriate terms into the contract of employment …  though 
there would have been a powerful argument for leaving the reform to Parliament. 
Lords Bingham and Nicholls agreed.  However, Lord Steyn would only have struck out 
the employee's claim due to remoteness difficulties.  He considered that there was a 
reasonable cause of action based on a breach of the implied obligation of trust and 
confidence.  In particular, he consid
 were adopted, and that a decrease in protection through collecti
63 
The unfair dismissal legislation must be put in context.  At the time of the Donovan report [in 
1968] collective bargaining was seen as the main form of protection of individual employees.  
It apparently covered about 83% of the workforce in 1980.  It has, however, been contracting 
steadily.  It felt to 35% in 1998.  In the result, individual legal rights have now become the main 
source of protection of employees:  see
Employment Contract:  From Collective Procedures to Individual Rights" (2000) 38 British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 611, 613-616. 
  
63  
62  Johnson, above, para 77. 
Johnson, above, para 23. 
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Lord Steyn was also sceptical of the proposition that the implied term, if applied in th
text, would conflict with the express provision permitting termination on notice:64 
This submission [by employer's counsel] loses sight of the particular nature of the implied 
obligation of mutual trust and confidence.  It is not a term implied in fact.  It is an overarching 
obligation implied by law as an incident of the contract of employment.  I
is 
con
t can also be 
nd globalisation, Lord Steyn said:  
imp
 f Brodie's most 
rec
genuinely exciting" way is blood chilling stuff!) 
ie 
reit
 [under the Woods implied term] will come to be seen as the core common law 
 
described as a legal duty imposed by law:  Treitel, The Law of Contract, p190.  It requires at least 
express words or a necessary implication to displace it or to cut down its scope. 
Further, after discussing an increased appreciation of stress-related problems suffered 
by employees in an era of deregulation, privatisation a
"The need for protection of employees through their contractual rights, express and 
lied by law, is markedly greater than in the past".65 
VIII APPLAUSE FROM THE (BRITISH) ACADEMY ... LESS FROM CHICAGO 
In both Malik and Johnson, Lord Steyn cited articles written by Douglas Brodie of the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Edinburgh.  Brodie has been an enthusiastic supporter 
of the Law Lords' endorsement of the trust and confidence implied term, but by no means 
the only one from within the ranks of British legal academia.  In one o
ent articles, he commences his concluding section as follows:  "The evolution of the law 
of the employment contract has been genuinely exciting in recent years".66 
(For those with a cautious view about the scope of judicial law-making, the idea that 
judge-made law is evolving in a "
In this article, which is the latest in a series offering the same perspective, Brod
erates his expectation that:67 
the obligation
duty which dictates how employees should be treated during the course of the employment 
relationship. 
... The open-textured nature of the [implied] term makes it an ideal conduit through which the 
Courts can challenge their views as to how the relationship should operate. 
From this it is obvious that Brodie asserts that the employer and the employee ought 
not to be left to determine how the employment relationship should operate, and that the 
 
64  Johnson, above, para 24. Lord Steyn also took the view that, as a breach of the implied term would 
sound in damages, it could operate consistently with an effective termination on notice. 
65  Johnson, above, para 25. 
66  Douglas Brodie "Mutual Trust and the Values of the Employment Contract" (2001) 30 ILJ 84. 
67  Douglas Brodie "Mutual Trust and the Values of the Employment Contract", above, 85 
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Courts should exercise an influential role in patrolling, through the implied term, the 
treatment of employees by employers.  This assumes not only that employees are 
vulnerable, bu ore than the 
exchange of wages for lab
hat workers contribute by participating in an employment 
 (or sub-community) is likely to 
dev
s the employer's commercial activity, and is "based on 
com
n in Johnson), to procedural fairness, and indeed to "all aspects of the 
employer's prerogative", including a general expectation of consultation and of consistency 
of treatment. 
 
t also that employment is a relationship involving much m
our.  Hence, Brodie observes, with approval:68 
In recent years the Courts' vision of the employment relationship has broadened. 
...  Just as the Courts have taken a broader view of what workers gain from employment they 
have similarly acknowledged w
relationship.  Far greater judicial recognition now exists that employment relations involve 
personal relations ... 
Just what these passages mean is, with respect, far from clear.  It must be true in the 
United Kingdom, as it is in New Zealand, that all but a tiny percentage of employees are 
employed by corporations or by Government agencies.  While the directors of such 
companies, and the managers employed, are human beings, it is difficult to see what 
describing their primary relationship as involving close "personal relations" means, unless 
it is a repetition of the point that the workplace will often provide a community of 
importance to the employee.  On that point, one might observe that, whenever several 
human beings get together on a regular basis, a community
elop, and to be of importance to its membership.  The question remains:  Does this tell 
us anything new or true about the nature of employment? 
Brodie is at least clear about his perception that it is wrong to approach an employment 
contract on the basis that it involve
mercial considerations".69  Such an approach is "heavily weighted in favour of 
employers", and thus undesirable. 
In considering the "great scope for development" of the implied term, Brodie suggests, 
with conscious reference to public law jurisprudence, that it permits the legitimate 
expectations of the parties to be given legal force.  It seems clear that Brodie assumes this 
will be done on the basis that there are no tiresome questions, such as have plagued public 
law, about whether the expectations are procedural rather than substantive, or whether 
there needs to be detrimental reliance.  Given the implied term's role of securing the 
meeting of legitimate expectations, and preventing the abuse of employer prerogative 
power, Brodie suggests that it might apply to termination (writing before the House of 
Lords' decisio
 
68  Douglas Brodie "Mutual Trust and the Values of the Employment Contract", above, 84. 
69  Criticising Secretary of State for Employment v ASLEF [1972] 2 All ER 949, 972 Buckley LJ (EWCA). 
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The only area which gives Brodie some pause appears to be that of disclosure.  He 
accepts that an obligation on a party to disclose its own breach of contract is "problematic", 
and that the same might be said of a greater obligation to report wrongdoing by others.  
The general tenor of Brodie's approach is indicated by his questions on this point: 
What say if one employee knows another is stealing in a situation where the employer is 
paying the statutory minimum wage and has just announced record profits?  Would an 
obligation to inform be acceptable given the huge disparities of power and wealth between the 
workforce and the employer? 
The same perspective has Brodie suggesting that the implied term might be used to 
reallocate risks in conventional areas of the employment contract.  He has in mind that the 
employee's obligation to take reasonable care in the performance of his or her duties might 
be rolled back by the implied term.  Nevertheless, it is clear that Brodie fears that the 
implied term may not be applied sufficiently enthusiastically to redress the "fundamental 
imbalance in power between employer and employee". 
Brodie concludes this article with the suggestion that the implied term is part of a 
profound change in the nature of contract law:70 
The obligation of mutual trust and confidence can be seen as part of broader changes in the 
law of obligations and therefore likely to endure and involve.  Its emergence in the UK is 
consistent with good faith playing a greater role in the law of contract as a whole.  From a 
different perspective Collins [Regulating Contracts, page 8] writes that 'legal systems are in a 
process of transition from the dominance of traditional private law regulation to one where 
welfareist regulation increasingly provides that basic discourse of the legal regulation of 
contracts'. 
This last point effectively anticipated the observation made by Lord Steyn in Johnson: 
It is no longer right to equate a contract of employment with commercial contracts.  One 
possible way of describing a contract of employment in modern terms is as a relational 
contract. 
For those not especially familiar with the concept of a "relational contract", some 
illumination may be found in an article by Professor Melvin A Eisenberg.71  Eisenberg 
elaborates on the proposition that relational contract theory stands as a contrasting mirror 
image of classical contract law:72 
  
70  Douglas Brodie "Mutual Trust and the Values of the Employment Contract", above, 100.  
71  Melvin A Eisenberg "Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts" (2000) 94 Northwestern 
University L Rev 805. 
72  In "Star Trek" terms:  contracts, Jim, but not as we know them. 
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Classical contract law was axiomatic and deductive; relational contract theory is open and 
inductive.  Classical contract law was standardised; relational contract theory is 
individualised.  Classical contract law was based on the paradigm of strangers transacting on a 
perfect market; relational contract theory is based on the paradigm of transactions by actors 
who are in an ongoing relationship, and often in a bilateral monopoly.  Classical contract law 
was static; relational contract theory is dynamic.  Classical contract law was based on 
rational-actor psychology; relational contract law is not. 
All of this is a very considerable distance from the analysis undertaken by those 
associated with the term "law and economics".  In particular, those pillars of the University 
of Chicago Law School, Judge Richard A Posner and Professor Richard A Epstein, have 
written in defence of employment "at will" — that is, employment terminable by either 
party, at any time and without grounds.  The term "at will" is used in contrast to "just 
cause" employment terminations. 
In his chapter on "Hegel and employment at will", Posner states:73 
Employment at will is a corollary of freedom of contract, and freedom of contract is a social 
policy with a host of economic and social justifications ...  Employment at will happens to be 
the logical terminus on the road that begins with slavery and makes intermediate stops at 
serfdom, indentured servitude, involuntary servitude and guild restrictions.  That should be a 
point in its favour. 
Posner goes on to make the point that employment at will, being a free market 
institution that is persistent and widespread, is presumptively more efficient than an 
externally imposed alternative.  In support of this proposition, he mentions the costs of 
litigation (or arbitration), the weakening of discipline in the workplace, and the contrasting 
relative efficiencies of the non-unionised private sector as against the unionised private 
sector and Government agencies (and universities).  He states: 
Do law professors know more about the efficient management of labor than business people?  
...  The "British system" of employment regulation is no more promising a model for our 
economy than the employment practices of our non-profit and Government sectors are.  And 
while it is plausible that cooperative relations between labor and management are more 
conducive to increases in productivity than antagonistic relations, it is implausible that 
granting workers tenure is an efficient method of fostering that cooperation.  If it were, why 
would not companies adopt it without prodding by Government? 
We must not neglect the incidence of the costs of a just-cause or rational-cause principle.  
Consumers will be hurt to the extent that the employer passed on part of these costs to its 
  
73  Richard A Posner "Hegel and employment at will" in Richard A Posner Overcoming Law (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1995). 
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customers in the form of high product prices.  Workers would be hurt the most  ...  The higher 
the indirect cost of employment, the lower the wage the employee will be willing to pay ...  
[and] unemployment would rise because the cost of labour would now be higher.  Employers 
would have an incentive to hire less, automate more, and relocate plants to foreign companies 
that do not have such protection. 
In Simple Rules for a Complex World,74 Epstein makes similar points, and goes on to state: 
The ubiquity of the contract at will in unregulated markets should be treated as a sign not of 
widespread corruption but a widespread utility.  To go against common practice, one needs to 
have enormous confidence in his own judgments about right and wrong.  Typically, those who 
know most about the subject are aware of the subtle variations between individual cases and 
are least willing to intervene in the affairs of others, no matter what organisational form they 
adopt.  But for those who have not faced the challenges on running a business, it is easy to 
disparage practices that are not understood.  The law and economics of labor contract and 
labor markets is a complex business, whose outlines have only been well explicated in the last 
generation.  Imperfections are the order of the day in all markets.  Anyone who thinks that the 
legal system can be operated without substantial error and cost is unduly optimistic about the 
power of law in general and of regulation in particular.  But as we learn more about labor 
markets this universal law should apply:  those who know the most seek to govern least. 
In a later lecture, given in Wellington,75 Esptein sought to emphasis the flexibility and 
interconnections in contractual bargaining, not least in employment: 
When we understand that how firms write one term of the contract will depend heavily on 
how they are allowed to write the other terms, we recognise that interfering with one 
dimension of an employment relationship will adversely affect all the other dimensions.  The 
employment contract should not be regarded as an exception ...  One must go back to the 
boring fundamentals, keep the law simple and coherent, and allow all the complexity to arise 
out of the actions of the people who know something about the transactions.  Judges and 
legislators can know precious little about those complexities, and they do best when they do 
precious little. 
In an earlier article, Epstein made the related point that:76 
The strength of the contract at will should not be judged by the occasional cases in which it is 
said to produce unfortunate results, but rather by the vast run of cases where it provides a 
  
74  Richard Epstein Simple Rules for a Complex World (Harvard, Cambridge (Mass), 1995). 
75  Richard Epstein "Restoring Sanctity of Contract in Employment Relationships" (NZ Business 
Roundtable, Wellington, 1999). 
76  Richard Epstein "In Defence of the Contract at Will" (1984) 51 University of Chicago Law Rev 947. 
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sensible private response to the many and varied problems in labor contracting.  All too often 
the case for a wrongful discharge doctrine rests upon the identification of possible employer 
abuses, as if they were all that mattered.  But the proper goal is to find the set of 
comprehensive arrangements that will minimize the frequency and severity of abuses by 
employers and employees alike. 
In these remarks, Epstein anticipated the conclusions offered in Sir Ian McKay's 1999 
FW Guest Memorial:77 
The longer one is involved in the law, the more one recognises the basic good sense of much of 
our common law.  One should be reluctant to depart from past practices without first 
understanding the reasons for them, and considering all the likely effects of any proposed 
change.  A judge must always remember that he or she sees only the tip of an iceberg, the 
small group of cases that arise from disputed questions that cannot be resolved except by the 
Court.  The success of our legal system should be judged by its predictability, and by the 
ability of the vast number of situations to be resolved without dispute. 
IX LEGITIMACY AND THE WOODS IMPLIED TERM 
At one level, there may be little point in querying whether the Woods formulation of the 
implied term of trust and confidence is "legitimate".  If both the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal and the British Law Lords say that it is the law, it is:  they are infallible, if only 
because they are final.78 
Nevertheless, and as Coutts Motors reminds us, notwithstanding the Employment 
Relations Act 2000, employment is a contractual arrangement, and there are longstanding 
common law principles on the implication of terms into contracts.  Judged against those, is 
the Woods implied term a legitimate use of the judicial power?  If not, what does it say of 
judicial decision-making in New Zealand and the United Kingdom in the last quarter of 
the 20th century? 
As noted earlier, the "Master and Servant" discussion in the first edition of Halsbury 
makes reference to implied terms.  Volume 7 of the same encyclopaedic work (published in 
1909), on "Contract", records strict requirements for the implication of a term not expressly 
stated by the parties.  The primary requirement was that it be: 
clear from the nature of the transaction or from something actually found in the document that 
the contracting parties must have intended such a term or condition to be a part of the 
agreement between them … and will only be made when it is necessary in order to give the 
transaction that efficacy that both parties must have intended to have, and to prevent such a 
  
77 Sir Ian McKay "Interpreting Statutes — a Judge's View" (2000) 9 Otago LR 743, 756. 
78 Brown v Allen (1953) 344 US 443, 540 Jackson J. 
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failure of consideration as could not have been within the contemplation of the parties. … It is 
not enough to say that it would be reasonable to make a particular implication, for a 
stipulation ought not to be imported into a written contract unless on considering the whole 
matter in a reasonable manner it is clear that the parties must have intended that there should 
be the suggested stipulation.  If the contract is effective without the suggested term and is 
capable of being fulfilled as it stands, an implication ought not to be made.  In every case the 
question whether an implication ought or not to be made would depend on the particular facts 
… 
A primary authority for that discussion was the decision in Robb v Green,79 relied on by 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Schilling,80 as mentioned earlier. 
In Robb an employee had copied a list of his employer's customers with the intention of 
using it, after leaving that employer's service to solicit those customers to his own new 
business.  Lord Esher MR had no doubt that such conduct "was a breach of the trust 
reposed in the defendant as a servant of the plaintiff in this business", and was prepared to 
hold (as were the other members of the Court of Appeal) that it amounted to a breach of 
contract — in particular, an implied stipulation "that the servant will act with good faith 
towards his master". 
Lord Esher justified the implication of the term on the basis that it was something 
which must necessarily have been in view of both parties when they entered into the 
contract.81  He cited Bowen LJ in Lamb v Evans:82 
What is an implied contract or an implied promise in law?  It is that promise which the law 
implies and authorises us to infer in order to give the transaction that effect which the parties 
must have intended to have, and without which it would be futile. 
In Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd,83 the House of Lords confirmed that an 
employee was under a contractual obligation of care to his employer, and (by a 4:1 
majority) rejected the argument that there was an implied term in the contract of service 
that an employee driver was entitled to be indemnified by his employer if it were (or ought 
to have been) insured.  In our present context, Lord Tucker's discussion of the implication 
of contractual terms is of some significance:84 
  
79  Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 315 (CA). 
80  Schilling v Kidd Garrett Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 243 (CA). 
81  Robb v Green, above, 318. 
82  Lamb v Evans [1893] 1 Ch 218, 239 (EWCA). 
83  Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555 (HL). 
84  Lister, above, 594. 
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Some contractual terms may be implied by general rules of law.  These general rules, some of 
which are now statutory, for example, Sale of Goods Act, Bills of Exchange Act, etc, derive in 
the main from the common law by which they have become attached in the course of time to 
certain classes of contractual relationships, for example, landlord and tenant, innkeeper and 
guest, contracts of guarantee and contracts of personal service.  Contrasted with such cases as 
these there are those in which from their particular circumstances it is necessary to imply a 
term to give efficacy to the contract and make it a workable agreement in such manner as the 
parties would clearly have done if they had applied their minds to the contingency which has 
arisen.  These are the 'officious bystander' type of case, to use MacKinnon LJ's well-known 
words.  I do not think the present case really comes in that category, it seems to me to fall 
rather within the first class referred to above. 
Without attempting an exhaustive enumeration of the duties imposed in this way upon a 
servant, I may mention:  (1) the duty to give reasonable notice in the absence of custom or 
express agreement;  (2) the duty to obey the lawful orders of the master;  (3) the duty to be 
honest and diligent in the master's service;  (4) the duty to take reasonable care of his master's 
property entrusted to him and generally in the performance of his duties;  (5) to account to his 
master for any secret commission or remuneration received by him;  (6) not to abuse his 
master's confidence in matters pertaining to his service:  cf Robb v Green. 
It would, I think, require very compelling evidence of some general change in circumstances 
affecting master and servant to justify the court in introducing some quite novel term into their 
contract, for example, a term absolving the servant from certain of the consequences of a 
breach of his recognised duty to take care, or as to the provision of insurance covering the 
servant's liability to third parties or his master. 
It may be seen that there is an imperfect match between Bowen LJ's analysis in Lamb v 
Evans, based on the parties' necessary intentions, had they turned their minds to the 
matter, and those which "have become attached in the course of time", referred to by Lord 
Tucker in Lister. 
In Liverpool City Council v Irwin, the House of Lords held that the Council's lease of a 
maisonette on the upper storeys of a tower block included an implied term to take 
reasonable care to keep the means of access in reasonable repair and usability.  Lord 
Wilberforce saw the implied term as implicitly and necessarily required by the nature of 
the contract:85 
I find it difficult to think of any term which it could be more necessary to imply than one 
without which the whole transaction would become futile, inefficacious and absurd as it 
would do if in a fifteen storey block of flats or maisonettes, such as the present, the landlords 
  
85  Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, 262-263. 
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were under no legal duty to take reasonable care to keep the lifts in working order and the 
staircases lit. 
In his speech, Lord Wilberforce suggested four varieties of implied term: 
(1) where there is an apparently complete bilateral contract, but terms were added to 
spell out what both parties know and would, if asked, have unhesitatingly agreed 
to be part of the bargain; 
(2) where there is an apparently complete bargain, but the courts are willing to add a 
term on the ground that without it the contract will not work; 
(3) where it is reasonable to do so (favoured by Lord Denning, but rejected by Lord 
Wilberforce and the other Law Lords); and 
(4) where the court is concerned to establish what the contract is, and thus searches 
for what must be implied to complete the terms of the contract. 
(Lord Wilberforce saw the Liverpool City case itself as an example of the fourth 
category.) 
A restatement of the requirements for implication of a contractual term by the Privy 
Council in BP Refinery (Western Port) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings,86 has been consistently 
applied in New Zealand.  It requires that the term to be implied must be reasonable and 
equitable; it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract so that no term will 
be implied if the contract is effective without it;  it must be so obvious that "it goes without 
saying"; it must be capable of clear expression; and it must not contradict any expressed 
term of the contract. 
In our Court of Appeal, the NZPPTA decision tells us that the test for implying terms 
into employment contracts is the same as for all other contracts.  That means BP Refinery:  
necessary for business efficacy; contract otherwise ineffective; and so on.  But somehow the 
Woods implied term has slipped through this filtering process, and without any explicit 
discussion. 
In other words, it is difficult to see that the Woods implied term is legitimate.  It may be 
recalled that in Courtaulds, the Employment Appeal Authority referred to a term 
"necessary to give [the employment contract] commercial and industrial validity".  This 
failed to address the question whether the contract was effective without the term sought 
to be implied; and, likewise, whether such a term was so obvious that "it goes without 
saying".  There was also the further question of whether it was "capable of clear 
expression". 
  
86  BP Refinery (Western Port) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 16 ALR 363. 
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On this last point, while the words of Browne-Wilkinson J in Woods are clearly 
expressed, the content of the implied term is anything but clear.  What does "seriously 
damage the relationship of confidence and trust between the parties" mean?  Insofar as the 
Woods term was meant to impose obligations on an employer, what is the confidence and 
trust that the employee "ought" to be able to have in the employer?  Is it that the employer 
is a competent business person?  That they are honest (the Malik situation was extreme — 
what of imperfect taxation returns, breaches of local authority by-laws or traffic 
regulations)?  Is it an expectation of pleasantness on the part of management towards 
employees?  Conversely, apart from honesty (including not purloining intellectual 
property, as in Robb), what is to be expected of an employee?  As Brodie acknowledges, an 
employee is unlikely to disclose wrongdoing on their own part, or even on that of other 
employees — is this contemplated?  And does the term extend to preclude persistent 
lobbying for better conditions or promotion by an employee (that is, Woods in reverse), 
who fails to take hints not to press the point further? 
The point underlying these questions obtains some reinforcement from the 
considerable care with which Lord Bridge set out a narrowly framed implied term in 
Scally.  It will be recalled that Lord Bridge adhered to the requirement for necessity, at least 
in the sense of the implied term being a necessary incident of a particular category of 
contractual relationship, which category was then defined in particularly precise terms. 
In Malik, Lord Nicholls seems to have adopted the proposition of "what goes without 
saying", which at least alludes to the classical "officious bystander" test. Lord Steyn simply 
asserted a standardised term implied by law as an incident of all contracts of employment, 
referring to Scally, but without reference to the "necessity" hurdle. 
Similarly, in Johnson, Lord Steyn reiterated that the term was not one implied in fact, 
but was an "over-arching obligation implied by law as an incident of the contract of 
employment".  To which one might respond that the obligation has obviously been 
imposed by law — in the form of the judges — but the question is against what criteria it 
ought to be, or could be, so imposed. 
In Malik, Lord Steyn suggested, by reference to a leading English text, Hepple 
& O'Higgins,87 that the implied term (or obligation) might have had its origins in the 
general duty of cooperation between contracting parties.  This point was endorsed by 
Douglas Brodie,88 describing the implied obligation as "a positive version of the general 
obligation of cooperation" (and footnoting this as "Hepple's insight"). 
  
87  Bob A Hepple and Paul O'Higgins Employment Law (4 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1981). 
88  Douglas Brodie "Beyond Exchange:  The New Contract of Employment" (1998) 27 ILJ 79. 
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This is unpersuasive.  A contractual obligation of cooperation was discussed by the 
Court of Appeal in Devonport Borough Council v Robbins.89  Both the judgment of 
Richardson J, and the joint judgment of Cooke and Quilliam JJ, cited Lord Blackburn in 
McKay v Dick:90 
Where in a written contract it appears that both parties have agreed that something shall be 
done, which cannot effectually be done unless both concur in doing it, the construction of the 
contract is that each agrees to do all that is necessary to be done on his part for the carrying out 
of that thing, though there may be no express words to that effect.  What is the part of each 
must depend on circumstances. 
Similarly, in Vickery v Waitaki International Limited,91 all three judgments make 
reference to a dictum of Cockburn CJ in Sterling v Maitland:92 
 
If a party enters into an arrangement which can only take effect by the continuance of a certain 
existing state of circumstances, there is an implied engagement on his part that he should do 
nothing of his own motion to put an end to that state of circumstances, under which alone the 
arrangement can be operative. 
On their face, neither the test in Sterling nor that in McKay could justify the Woods 
implied term:  in each, the essential requirement is necessity — the absence of other 
options.  The same point emerges from the fuller discussion of the topic by John 
Burrows.93 
It might be said, in defence of the Woods implied term, that if it was good enough for 
the classical common law to imply a duty of fidelity applicable to employees, it is good 
enough for the modern common law to imply a mutual trust and confidence term.  But 
does this survive analysis?  The employee's duty of fidelity reflects the fact that an 
employee must often have unsupervised access to the employer's property.  It would be 
absurd (as everyone knows, or as officious bystanders would agree) if theft of the 
employer's property did not involve a breach of the employment contract.  The implied 
fidelity is necessarily required by the nature of the contract.  What fact, what absurdity, 
and what kind of bystander, demands the implication of a duty that an employer act so as 
to maintain the employee's trust and confidence?  On this, the case-law to date is silent. 
 
89  Devonport Borough Council v Robbins [1979] 1 NZLR 1. 
90  McKay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251, 263. 
91  Vickery v Waitaki International Limited [1992] 2 NZLR 58 (CA). 
92  Sterling v Maitland (1864) 5 B&S 840. 
93  John Burrows "Contractual Cooperation and the Implied Term" (1968) 31 MLR 390. 
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X PRAISEWORTHY LAW-MAKING, OR NOT? 
At the end of the story, looking back, what do we see?  Perhaps the following: 
(1) The legislative introduction of "unjustifiability" as a higher test for employer 
termination of employment contracts, initially only those subject to industrial 
awards, but from 1991 applicable to all employment contracts; 
(2) The gradual importation from British employment jurisprudence of a broadly 
stated implied term, invented to overcome a perceived (and narrow) problem in 
quite differently worded legislation, and on the basis of minimal evidence or even 
argument; 
(3) The restatement of that term as one of "good faith"; 
(4) In the result, a broad and flexible (or, on another view, unpredictable and 
unbargained for) mechanism to control employer actions which judges find 
unattractive or unreasonable; 
(5) A suggestion that this development may foreshadow more general changes to the 
traditional understanding of contract law; 
(6) Any assessment of the merits of the judicial formation and acceptance of the 
implied term of trust and confidence in employment will reflect a personal 
perspective.  It seems clear that Douglas Brodie and Lord Steyn, for example, 
perceive those merits as very substantial.  Another perspective, offered below (and 
foreshadowed earlier), is more sceptical; 
(7) As this is a review of a judicial law-making exercise, some questions that occur are: 
• Was any change to the legal rules required at all? 
• If so, was it a task for the judges or the legislature? 
• If a task for the judges, was it undertaken on sound analysis and evidence? 
• Is the result one which contributes to the clarity and predictable application 
of the legal rules formulated? 
A Was Any Change Required? 
In the English context, the Woods implied term was consciously designed to avoid the 
perceived limits of the Court of Appeal's Western Excavating decision in the area of 
repudiation and constructive dismissal.  In Courtaulds the employee needed to show a 
fundamental term had been breached to justify his constructive dismissal claim.  The 
specific problem identified in Woods was employer conduct amounting to "squeezing out" 
an unwanted employee. 
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From a New Zealand perspective, it is doubtful that, post-Hennesey and the expansive 
interpretation of "unjustified", the Woods implied term was necessary.  The particular 
problem addressed in Courtaulds and Woods was that of employer actions likely to 
discourage an employee from remaining in the employment, but short of a singular 
repudiatory action.  Both were "constructive" dismissal cases.  The scope of "unjustifiable" 
after Hennesey, and the legislative extension of personal grievances to not only unjustified 
dismissals but also unjustifiable actions short of dismissal, very effectively removed the 
problem. 
On the same reasoning, it may be said that Woolworths required no more than 
confirmation that unjustified dismissal included unjustified constructive dismissals.  There 
was no need for the narrow implied term or duty asserted "without doubt" as to carrying 
out fairly and reasonably an inquiry into possible dishonesty by an employee.  The Court 
did not address either Hennesey or the relevance in New Zealand of the "squeezing out" 
problem identified in Woods.  It may be that Hennesey was not cited by counsel, a 
supposition perhaps reinforced by the Woolworths Court's general observation about 
applying "natural justice to contemporary industrial relations". 
It may also be said that the Woolworths judgment was alive to some of the definitional 
problems with implying a term in this context.  The judgment adopts a narrowly defined 
term (fair and reasonable inquiry into possible dishonesty).  It also criticised Lord 
Denning's suggestion in Woods of an employer duty to be just and considerate as 
"nebulous", at least relative to Browne-Wilkinson J's formulation.  But what was absent in 
the Woolworths judgment, and in those that followed, was discussion of just how nebulous 
the trust and confidence term might be, and what advantages or disadvantages it might 
involve across the wide range of employment contracts.  In the absence of that discussion, 
it is surely difficult to say that the judicial law-making process established any need for a 
change in the pre-existing legal roles. 
B Was Any Change a Matter for Legislation? 
In considering whether any change to legal rules was more appropriate for the judges 
or for the legislature, the point already made is that the legislature had effectively done all 
that might reasonably have been required in legislating into employment contracts the 
requirements that dismissals and other disadvantageous actions affecting employees be 
"justifiable".  Beyond that, Lord Hoffmann in Johnson identified the important point that, to 
the extent that employment law requires the balancing of the interest of employers and 
employees, it inevitably touches on the "general economic interest" and is "a matter for 
democratic decision". 
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C Sound Analysis and Evidence? 
On the evidence of the judgments delivered in Courtaulds and Woods, there was no 
substantial analysis or evidence upon which the courts acted when the implied term was 
first formulated and adopted.  Similarly, when the appellate courts approved it in both the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand, no substantial analysis or evidence was undertaken or 
provided. 
It is beyond argument that the primary factor which has driven the development of the 
Woods implied term has been a change in judicial perceptions of employment, or, as Lord 
Steyn described it in Malik, a "change in legal culture".  But when one seeks to identify the 
foundations of any such change in perception or culture, the judgments of the Courts offer 
little.  Lord Nicholls in Malik stated that jobs were less secure than formerly, that people 
change jobs more frequently, that the job market was not always buoyant:  "Everyone 
knows this."  Perhaps, but had he forgotten the 1930s' depression?  Or the 1950s' mobility?  
Where is the change? 
Similarly in Johnson, Lord Hoffmann asserted that the nature of the employment 
contract "has been transformed" over the last 30 years or so.  Regrettably, he failed to 
elaborate on how and why, apart from mentioning a (judicial) recognition that a person's 
employment is usually one of the most important things in his or her life.  At least since the 
beginning of urbanisation, and the wage economy, that will have been so.  Again, where is 
the change? 
Also in Johnson, Lord Millett related the change of the past 30 years to the statutory 
changes of the 1970s, and went on to observe:94 
But the common law does not stand still.  It is in a state of continuous judicial development in 
order to reflect the changing perceptions of the community.  Contracts of employment are no 
longer regarded as purely commercial contracts entered into between free and equal agents. 
As authority for this assertion, he cited from a Supreme Court of Canada decision 
about the importance of work, and the trauma of losing a job.  This hardly rates as a 
"change in perceptions of the community".  Again, what evidence, and what recognition of 
the very "general economic interest" that Lord Hoffmann referred to in his speech in 
Johnson?  Is this really a matter for judicial notice? 
Inevitably, one's attention is attracted by the lack of impact of the "law and economics" 
approach in our story, as in British legal discourse generally.  But it would appear that 
none of the points made by Epstein and Posner were addressed by any of the many judges 
who have caused the Woods implied term to become "established" — including, it has to be 
  
94  Johnson v Unisys Limited [2001] UKHL 13, para 77. 
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said, the New Zealand judges.  Indeed, one strongly suspects that the Epstein/Posner 
points were not even raised by counsel. 
D Clarity and predictable application of legal rules 
In its own terms, let alone what it might add to the statutory "unjustifiable" test, the 
Woods implied term can hardly be said to be clear or predictable.  In situations of employee 
dishonesty, whether in relation to physical or intellectual property, it is not difficult to say 
that there has been a breach of the trust which an employer would ordinarily place in an 
employee.  Beyond that, it is difficult to see that an employee is, in any meaningful sense, a 
fiduciary (that is, putting the employer's interests ahead of the employee's interests).  Or 
vice versa:  indeed, in Hale and Aoraki the Court of Appeal has made it clear that employers 
are able to manage their enterprises in a commercially effective manner, which may well 
adversely impact on employees' job security. 
In the recent Coutts Motors decision, and at least implicitly reflecting Browne-Wilkinson 
VC's reformulation in Imperial Group, the implied term has been redescribed as one of 
"good faith".  While this does have the advantage of harmonising with the statutory 
language of the Employment Relations Act 2000, it shares with the statutory language a 
conspicuous lack of clarity, and is very greatly removed from the traditional basis of the 
common law, discussed well in Burrows' article.95 
In approaching a conclusion to this paper, it is useful to return to its starting point:  Sir 
Ivor Richardson's judgment in Brighouse.  That judgment's statement of a principled 
approach to redundancy cases illustrates a full appreciation that provisions in employment 
contracts have "an economic value and an economic price"; that it is for the parties to 
negotiate the enforceable contents of an employment contract; and that an employer's 
commercial judgments about its operational needs, and any necessary restructuring 
strategies, are entitled to judicial respect. 
Indeed, Sir Ivor's Brighouse judgment rather suggests that the relevance of "mutual 
obligations of confidence, trust and fair dealing" is in underlying the statutory concept of 
unjustifiability.  The actual results of the subsequent cases in which Sir Ivor has presided 
are broadly consistent with that suggestion.  On the other hand, the rhetorical expansion to 
"good faith" provides for the future, in Brodie's language, the ideal conduit for the Courts 
to give effect to their views as to how the employment relationship should operate. 
It is true that there was room for a more sympathetic view of the employee's position 
than was provided under the classical law of employment contracts.  It is also true that 
legislatures in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand had imposed various "just 
cause" requirements on dismissals, and, further, that the courts had received academic 
  
95  Burrows, above. 
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praise and tacit legislative acceptance of their engrafting of natural justice principles into 
statutory regimes.  But this writer remains unpersuaded that the adoption of the Woods 
implied term, or the implied term of good faith, has enhanced the clarity or predictable 
application of the legal rules governing employment contracts. 
Obviously enough, the Woods implied term, and perhaps the good faith term, are here 
to stay.  The rhetoric of "trust and confidence" splendidly begs many of the important 
questions, final appellate decisions are well entrenched, and there is no groundswell of 
political opposition to the implied term.  For this writer, the important ongoing question is 
the scope and foundation of judicial law-making in our era.  On that question, there is still 
perhaps something to be said for the naif who queries the paucity of the imperial clothing. 
 
